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Optimal Control Expectations and Uncertainty 2010 Edition at Meripustak

Optimal Control Expectations and Uncertainty 2010 Edition by Sean Holly, Andrew Hughes Hallet , CAMBRIDGE

Books from same Author: Sean Holly, Andrew Hughes Hallet

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  • General Information  
    Author(s)Sean Holly, Andrew Hughes Hallet
    PublisherCAMBRIDGE
    ISBN9780521126335
    Pages260
    BindingPaperback
    LanguageEnglish
    Publish YearJanuary 2010

    Description

    CAMBRIDGE Optimal Control Expectations and Uncertainty 2010 Edition by Sean Holly, Andrew Hughes Hallet

    The rational expectations revolution and other developments in economics (notably game theory) have fundamentally altered the application of optimal control theory to economic forecasting and planning. In particular, they have shown that economic systems cannot be modelled simplistically on physical systems. However, as the authors of this volume show, these developments have greatly enhanced our understanding of how an economy functions, and now make it possible for optimal control theory to be applied much more effectively to economic modelling and planning. This book is divided into two parts. The first presents the orthodox framework but extends it to allow for multiplicative uncertainty, risk and non-linearities in the econometric model. The second part looks explicitly at the question of expectations. It provides methods by which forward-looking expectations can be treated jointly with the determination of economic policy. It also examines game-theoretic considerations - where, for instance, policy makers may have incentive to renege on their commitments. Table of contents :- Preface; 1. Introduction; 2. The theory of economic policy and the linear model; 3. Optimal-policy design; 4. Uncertainty and risk; 5. Risk aversion, priorities and achievements; 6. Non-linear optimal control; 7. The linear rational-expectations model; 8. Policy design for rational-expectations models; 9. Non-cooperative, full-information dynamic games; 10. Incomplete information, bargaining and social optima; Notes; References; Index.



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