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Berghahn Books A State of Peace in Europe West Germany and the CSCE 1966-1975 2011 Edition by Petri Hakkarainen
From the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s West German foreign policy underwent substantial transformations: from bilateral to multilateral, from reactive to proactive. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was an ideal setting for this evolution, enabling the Federal Republic to take the lead early on in Western preparations for the conference and to play a decisive role in the actual East-West negotiations leading to the Helsinki Final Act of 1975. Based on extensive original research of recently released documents, spanning more than fifteen archives in eight countries, this study is a substantial contribution to scholarly discussions on the history of detente, the CSCE and West German foreign policy. The author stresses the importance of looking beyond the bipolarity of the Cold War decades and emphasizes the interconnectedness of European integration and European detente. He highlights the need to place the genesis of the CSCE conference in its historical context rather than looking at it through the prism of the events of 1989, and shows that the bilateral and multilateral elements (Ostpolitik and the CSCE) were parallel rather than successive phenomena, parts of the same complex process and in constant interaction with each other. Table of contents :- List of AbbreviationsAcknowledgementsChapter 1. Introduction: Era of NegotiationsEuropean DetenteThe CSCEGerman Foreign PolicyOn Structure and SourcesChapter 2. 1966-69: Incubation of StrategiesThe Early Years and the Eastern 'Propaganda Circus'The Budapest Appeal: 'We Could Have Drafted it Ourselves'Consultations Abroad, Electioneering at HomeNobody Expects the Finnish InitiativePromises of East-West Cooperation or an Instrument of Deutschlandpolitik?Chancellery versus Auswartiges AmtEmphasis on Linkage: Bahr's Foreign Policy Plans on the Eve of the ElectionBonn and the Security Conference during the InterregnumConclusionChapter 3. 1969-70: Bilateral Leverages and European SecurityWestern Support for the Linkage with DeutschlandpolitikHorse-Trading in MoscowRethinking the Linkage StrategyBerlin Surpasses Other PreconditionsDiscovering the Potential of the CSCEConference on Security or Conference on Cooperation?ConclusionChapter 4. 1970-71: Transition to Western MultilateralismFollowing the French Lead on Berlin LinkageDefending the Berlin Precondition in LisbonDivergent Interpretations of the 'Successful Conclusion'Nothing Quiet on the Western FrontBroadening the German Horizon in the NATO FrameworkFrom America's Advocate to the Main Proponent of EPCConclusionChapter 5. 1971-72: Towards a European Peace Order?The Decline of the Linkage between the CSCE and DeutschlandpolitikHesitating on the Berlin PreconditionBlackmailing the Finns?An Inner-German Shotgun WeddingEuropeanisation of OstpolitikIn Defence of the Eastern Treaties and Bonn's SovereigntyA New Flow of German ActivityPeaceful Change, Self-Determination of Peoples and Military SecurityFreer Movement: Change through Rapprochement?Berlin as a CSCE Location?Avoiding BilateralismConclusionChapter 6. 1972-75: Deutschlandpolitik at the ConferenceAlphabet Diplomacy in DipoliPeaceful Change, Act 1: Defending the Moscow TreatyPeaceful Change, Act 2: Enter GenscherPeaceful Change, Act 3: Commas for the National InterestBasket III: Human ContactsFollow-up and BerlinConclusionChapter 7. Conclusion: Evolution instead of RevolutionSources and BibliographyIndex