Description
Lexington Books Kant Ought Implies Can the Principle of Alternate Possibilities and Happiness by Samuel Kahn
Throughout his corpus, Kant repeatedly and resolutely denies that there is a duty to promote one's own happiness, and most present-day Kantians seem to agree with him. In Kant, Ought Implies Can, the Principle of Alternate Possibilities, and Happiness, Samuel Kahn argues that this denial rests on two main ideas: (1) a conception of duty that makes the principle of ought implies can (OIC) and the principle of alternate possibilities (PAP) analytic, and (2) the claim that humans necessarily promote their own happiness. This book defends OIC and PAP but nonetheless attacks the second idea, and it supplements this attack with two additional arguments-an interpersonal one and an intrapersonal one-for the claim that a modern day Kantian ethics should affirm a duty to promote one's own happiness._x000D_ Table of contents :- _x000D_
Introduction_x000D_
Part One. Ought implies can in Kantian ethics_x000D_
Chapter 1. Terminology and Exegesis_x000D_
Section 1. Terminology _x000D_
Section 2. Exegesis_x000D_
Chapter 2. Arguments in Favor of OIC_x000D_
Section 1. Kant's argument for OIC_x000D_
Section 2. The argument from explanation_x000D_
Section 3. The fairness argument_x000D_
Section 4. The prescriptivist argument_x000D_
Section 5. The argument from deontic logic_x000D_
Chapter 3. Objections to OIC_x000D_
Section 1. The appeal to alternate traditions_x000D_
Section 2. The epistemic argument_x000D_
Section 3. The ordinary language objection_x000D_
Section 4. The appeal to culpable inability_x000D_
Section 5. The argument from past obligations_x000D_
Section 6. The argument from simplicity_x000D_
Section 7. The argument from excuses_x000D_
Section 8. The appeal to Hume's principle_x000D_
Section 9. The argument from reasons_x000D_
Section 10. The moral satisfaction objection_x000D_
Section 11. The appeal to obligations from nowhere_x000D_
Section 12. The argument from interdependence_x000D_
Section 13. The argument from epistemic oughts_x000D_
Section 14. The argument from feeling oughts_x000D_
Section 15. The appeal to conflicts of duties_x000D_
Section 16. The argument from emphasis_x000D_
Section 17. The appeal to conversational implicature_x000D_
Section 18. The exphi objection_x000D_
Part Two. The principle of alternate possibilities_x000D_
Chapter 4. Setting the stage_x000D_
Section 1. Frankfurt's seminal attack_x000D_
Section 2. Conceding PAP but mitigating the consequences_x000D_
Chapter 5. The connection between PAP and OIC_x000D_
Section 1. OIC entails PAP with respect to blame_x000D_
Section 2. Blame requires impermissibility_x000D_
Section 3. Able not to and able to do otherwise_x000D_
Section 4. Some concluding remarks_x000D_
Chapter 6. The second line of defense_x000D_
Section 1. The metaphysical premise_x000D_
Subsection 1. Flickers and alchemy_x000D_
Subsection 2. The dilemma defense_x000D_
Subsection 3. The deterministic horn_x000D_
Subsection 4. The new dispositionalists_x000D_
Subsection 5. Morally relevant alternatives_x000D_
Section 2. The moral premise_x000D_
Subsection 1. PAP and OIC_x000D_
Subsection 2. The W-defense_x000D_
Subsection 3. Counterfactual interveners and knowledge_x000D_
Subsection 4. The reliability of intuitions_x000D_
Part Three. The duty to promote one's own happiness in Kantian ethics_x000D_
Chapter 7. "Happiness," "general duties" and the standard account_x000D_
Section 1. "Happiness"_x000D_
Section 2. "General duties"_x000D_
Section 3. The standard account_x000D_
Chapter 8. The means to happiness, indirect duties and two arguments for a direct duty_x000D_
Section 1. Indirect duties_x000D_
Section 2. Two arguments for a direct duty_x000D_
Chapter 9. Objections_x000D_
Section 1. Internal incoherence_x000D_
Section 2. The universal desire for happiness_x000D_
Section 3. Happiness as a necessary end_x000D_
Section 4. A duty to promote one's own happiness would be otiose_x000D_
Section 5. Happiness is impossible_x000D_
Notes_x000D_
Bibliography_x000D_