Description
Hans Beumer The Internal Audit Handbook - The Business Approach to Driving Audit Value by Hans Beumer
The Internal Audit Handbook - the Business Approach to Driving Audit Value The Internal Audit Handbook combines the Volumes I, II and III of Driving Audit Value in a comprehensive internal audit handbook. This Driving Audit Value Bundle integrates the best practice strategies of the internal audit function, internal audit engagement and the internal audit risk management into one definitive, practical and extensive reference manual of 740 pages. This handbook is a must-have for all internal audit professionals who want to elevate their performance far above the expectations of their board and management. Use this best practice guide for implementing a value-added internal audit strategy. Follow the business approach to internal auditing for maximising the internal audit added value and minimising the internal audit risks, based on proven strategy models. Hans Beumer was CAE for 16 years and has a Master degree in Business Economics and was educated and trained as Dutch CPA, CIA, CISA, CRMA and CFE._x000D_ Table of contents : - _x000D_
Introduction Motivating Problems in Network Economics Mechanism Design Outline of the Monograph_x000D_
Foundations of Mechanism Design Strategic Form Games Dominant Strategy Equilibria Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium Bayesian Games The Mechanism Design Environment Examples of Social Choice Functions Implementation of Social Choice Functions Incentive Compatibility and the Revelation Theorem Properties of Social Choice Functions The Gibbard Satterthwaite Impossibility Theorem Arrow's Impossibility Theorem The Quasi Linear Environment Groves Mechanisms Clarke (Pivotal) Mechanisms Examples of VCG Mechanisms Bayesian Implementation: The dAGVA Mechanism Bayesian Incentive Compatibility in Linear Environment Revenue Equivalence Theorem Myerson Optimal Auction Further Topics in Mechanism Design To Probe Further_x000D_
Mechanism Design for Sponsored Search Auctions Internet Advertising Sponsored Search Auction Sponsored Search Auction as a Mechanism Design Problem Generalized First Price (GFP) Mechanism Generalized Second Price (GSP) Mechanism Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) Mechanism Optimal (OPT) Mechanism Comparison of GSP, VCG, and OPT Mechanisms Individual Rationality Computational Complexity Summary and Future Work Related Literature_x000D_
Mechanism Design for Resource Procurement in Grid Computing Grid Computing The Model The G-DSIC Mechanism The G-BIC Mechanism G-OPT: An Optimal Auction Mechanism Current Art and Future Perspective_x000D_
Incentive Compatible Broadcast Protocols for Ad hoc Networks with Selfish Nodes Introduction to Ad hoc Wireless Networks Ad hoc Networks with Selfish Nodes Relevant Work on Incentive Compatible Protocols A Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatible Broadcast Protocol A Bayesian Incentive Compatible Broadcast (BIC-B) Protocol DSIC-B Protocol versus BIC-B Protocol: A Discussion Conclusions and Future Work_x000D_
To Probe Further Topics in Mechanism Design Key Application Areas In Conclusion_x000D_