×







We sell 100% Genuine & New Books only!

The Theory Of Incentives at Meripustak

The Theory Of Incentives by Martimort David, New Age International (P) Ltd., Publishers

Books from same Author: Martimort David

Books from same Publisher: New Age International (P) Ltd., Publishers

Related Category: Author List / Publisher List


  • Price: ₹ 295.00/- [ 5.00% off ]

    Seller Price: ₹ 280.00

Estimated Delivery Time : 4-5 Business Days

Sold By: Meripustak      Click for Bulk Order

Free Shipping (for orders above ₹ 499) *T&C apply.

In Stock

We deliver across all postal codes in India

Orders Outside India


Add To Cart


Outside India Order Estimated Delivery Time
7-10 Business Days


  • We Deliver Across 100+ Countries

  • MeriPustak’s Books are 100% New & Original
  • General Information  
    Author(s)Martimort David
    PublisherNew Age International (P) Ltd., Publishers
    Edition1
    ISBN9788122417104
    Pages436
    BindingPaperback
    LanguageEnglish
    Publish YearJanuary 2006

    Description

    New Age International (P) Ltd., Publishers The Theory Of Incentives by Martimort David

    Economics has much to do with incentives not least, incentives to work hard, to produce quality products, to study, to invest, and to save. Although Adam Smith amply confirmed this more than two hundred years ago in his analysis of sharecropping contracts, only in recent decades has a theory begun to emerge to place the topic at the heart of economic thinking. In this book, Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort present the most thorough yet accessible introduction to incentives theory to date. Central to this theory is a simple question as pivotal to modern-day management as it is to economics research: What makes people act in a particular way in an economic or business situation? In seeking an answer, the authors provide the methodological tools to design institutions that can ensure good incentives for economic agents. This book focuses on the principal-agent model, the simple situation where a principal, or company, delegates a task to a single agent through a contract the essence of management and contract theory. How does the owner or manager of a firm align the objectives of its various members to maximize profits? Following a brief historical overview showing how the problem of incentives has come to the fore in the past two centuries, the authors devote the bulk of their work to exploring principal-agent models and various extensions thereof in light of three types of information problems: adverse selection, moral hazard, and non-verifiability. Offering an unprecedented look at a subject vital to industrial organization, labor economics, and behavioral economics, this book is set to become the definitive resource for students, researchers, and others who might find themselves pondering what contracts, and the incentives they embody, are really all about. This special low-priced edition is for sale in India, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives, Nepal, Myanmar, Pakistan and Sri Lanka only.



    Book Successfully Added To Your Cart